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Tibet and China’s ‘National Minority’ Policies  
 
 
By Michael C. Davis 
 
 
Michae l  C.  Davis  is a Professor in the University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law. This 
article is a revised version of a paper he delivered at a conference on “Contested Terrain: China’s 
Periphery and International Relations in Asia. The event was sponsored by the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, D.C. on November 4, 
2011. 
 
 
 
Abstract: China’s hardline and repressive policies have often stood in the way of its acceptance 
on the international stage. This legacy has nowhere been more evident than with respect to its 
national minority policies applied in Tibet. While China long ago in the 1951 17-point 
Agreement agreed to provide autonomy to Tibetans it has never delivered on this promise, 
offering repression and assimilation instead. In nearly every diplomatic outing, as was especially 
evident in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s Tibet policies have been an issue. 
With the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the 2008 Tibetan 
Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People China surely has excellent 
guidance for a more humane policy to meet Tibetan concerns. With reference to its historical 
legacy and international standards, this paper encourages China to embrace such policy reform. 
 
 
hina has recently taken to labeling 
claims to peripheral territory as  
“core interest,” as if such labeling 
might eliminate any competing 
claims While the past year has most notably 
seen the extension of such designation to 
regions beyond China’s current control in the 
East and South China seas, Beijing              
has        long taken such aggressive posture 
regarding occupied areas along its Western 
borders—especially in Tibet  
 
and the Uyghur areas of present-day Xinjiang. Each of these areas shares the status of 
being the homeland of a distinctive nationality with a separate language, culture and 
history. Both were occupied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) soon after its 
C 
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founding. While the Tibetan and Uyghur areas share in common aggressive and 
dismissive
 
Chinese national minority policies and laws, their distinctive history and 
analytical posture make the coverage of one case, Tibet, a fruitful vehicle for exploring 
the implications of such nationality policies in the border regions more generally. After 
decades of Chinese posturing over foreign criticism and discussions with the exiled 
Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan case offers a telling example with
 
deep 
implications for Chinese foreign policy and assessing China’s rise. The Tibet issue has 
been most directly of concern to China’s immediate neighbor, India, but has also been a 
long-standing foreign policy concern in both the United States and Europe.
 
 
Superficially, the positions publicly taken by the Tibetan leadership in exile and the 
Chinese government appear to overlap considerably. 1  The Dharamsala-based 
Government-in-Exile, under the Dalai Lama and its newly elected Kalon Tripa or Prime 
Minister, has long sought a renewed agreement granting Tibet genuine autonomy under 
the Chinese constitution. Proposals in this regard were formally submitted to the 
Chinese Government in the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy for the 
Tibetan People. 2 As discussed below, the Chinese Government has likewise claimed to 
offer autonomy under its national minority laws. Such autonomy was first promised in 
respect to Tibet under a Seventeen-point Agreement reached between the PRC and the 
Dalai Lama in 1951.3
 While China has since extended this autonomy promise in much more limited form to 
fifty-five designated national minorities, the Tibetan case of an historic nation on China’s 
border has remained distinctive, as the only “national minority” with which the PRC has 
entered a bilateral agreement, promising a high degree of autonomy under an indigenous 
form of self-rule. The Tibet case shares only with the Uyghur case the status of a border 
nationality with historically distinct identity occupying a substantial portion of the 
territory currently ruled by the PRC.4 However, even the Uyghur do not possess a 
comparable agreement with the PRC government. The Seventeen-Point Agreement is  
widely believed to be the precursor to the “one country, two systems” model, with its 
“high degree of autonomy” now applied in Hong Kong and Macau, though the PRC 
government refuses to apply such Hong Kong model in Tibet. China’s designation of 
fifty-five national minorities may aim at watering down the distinctive status and 
consequent obligations to the Tibetan people. Except for the Tibetans, Uyghur and 
Mongols, most minority nationalities are well within historically occupied Chinese 
                                            
1 Warren W. Smith, Jr. sees the two sides position as irreconcilable, as the central issue for Tibetans is the 
maintenance of Tibetan national identity and for the Chinese is to extinguish it. Warren W. Smith, Jr. China's Tibet: 
2 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Issued During the Eighth Sino- Tibetan Meeting,  
Nov. 4, 2008 (hereinafter “Tibetan Memorandum”). See also “Summary of the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy 
for the Tibetan People,” Dharamsala, India, Nov. 16, 2008. 
3 Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951 (hereinafter “Seventeen-point Agreement”). 
4 Tibetan areas currently occupied by the PRC make up roughly one-quarter of the present PRC. The other border 
nationality with substantial historical territory are the Mongols, though they have been reduced to a small minority in 
their region. 
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territory and do not contest Chinese sovereignty. 
Assessing Chinese public pronouncements and policies in light of international practices 
and standards may shed light on the current impasse and suggest possible alternatives 
going forward. This article addresses these Chinese policies and pronouncements in four 
parts: first, to set the tone, the stridency of China’s recent public statements in the 
shadow of the 2008 Tibetan uprising and the Beijing Olympics; second, historical 
policies and current practice regarding the claimed provision of autonomy in Tibet; 
third, international standards regarding similarly situated indigenous populations; and 
fourth, recommendations regarding both Chinese policies and international foreign 
policy responses. 
These recommendations will suggest the usefulness of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples as a framework and recommend the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum 
as a negotiating document that approximates these international standards. That 
recommendation will encourage a Chinese path that embodies the same spirit of 
inventiveness that it employed in creating the “one country, two systems” model now 
applied in Hong Kong and Macau and proposed for Taiwan. Such approach would 
enable China to shape a hybrid Tibetan solution that achieves the genuine autonomy 
embraced by the Tibetan Memorandum. The present analysis will not question the 
Tibetan exile government’s formal stance on seeking autonomy versus independence, as 
this is a question with both substantive and strategic implications for Tibetans to decide. 
A China that employs its rising power to repress indigenous and other internal 
populations and to intimidate its neighbors cannot help but pay an international price in 
suspicion and criticism for such aggressive stance. In this sense, Tibet has always been 
part of a larger policy concern that stretches beyond border security and internal 
resources. For China, seeing Tibet in limited security terms has been costly. With China’s 
rise—and increasing global reach and potential—this price can only increase. In this 
sense, a viable solution to the Tibet problem may contribute to the effort to address 
wider peripheral concerns beyond Tibet, including even the Uyghur case. In moving 
forward in this regard China may also acquire a gentler less threatening face in its other 
international endeavors, reducing concerns currently associated with China’s rise. Since 
the Chinese Government has rejected suggestions for a more moderate Tibet stance, 
realization of such policy objectives is likely to require international diplomatic 
engagement along similar policy lines for some time to come. 
The Current Impasse: China’s Reaction to Recent Tibetan 
Disturbances and Discussions 
The March 2008 Tibetan uprising, the subsequent Chinese crackdown and the 
international protests that followed the Olympic torch attracted considerable 
international concern, embarrassing Chinese officials as they prepared to host the 2008 
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Beijing Olympics. Beijing faced considerable international pressure to meet with the 
Dalai Lama’s representatives and resolve this long-standing dispute. 5 Though Chinese 
officials quickly moved into damage control, their subsequent actions and statements 
raise doubt about their intentions. The approach taken seemed aimed at putting out the 
immediate fire until the Olympics had passed and then bringing the Tibet problem under 
firm control. This mode of proceeding has long plagued Chinese policies in its periphery 
and has long attracted skepticism about its intentions in areas it identifies as core 
interests. Chinese officials quickly held an informal meeting with the Dalai Lama’s 
representatives in Shenzhen near Hong Kong in May of 2008 and scheduled the seventh 
and eighth rounds in their ongoing formal dialogue to begin in July and late October that 
year, a time line just sufficient to get past the Beijing Olympics. 
While international leaders and diplomats held out hope for substantive Sino-Tibetan 
dialogue, the marching orders for Chinese representatives were clearly more limited. 
They merely reiterated China’s long-standing official position that Sino-Tibetan 
“contacts and dialogues were about the Dalai Lama's personal future, and not so-called 
"China-Tibet negotiation" or "dialogue between Han and Tibetan people." 6  They 
insisted on three “stops” to: “stop activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and 
inciting violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games.” This 
was later refined to “four non-supports”: “not to support activities to disturb the 
upcoming Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent criminal activities, 
not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of the "Tibetan Youth 
Congress" and not to support any argument and activity to seek "Tibet independence" 
and split the region from the country.”7 The exiled Tibetan leadership has long met these 
conditions, and there is no record of the moderate Tibetan Youth Congress engaging in 
terrorist activities. 
Though their earlier efforts in the 1950s to win over the Dalai Lama’s support belie such 
claim, Chinese officials dismissively challenged the Dalai Lama’s credentials to represent 
the Tibetan people, insisting that he must speak to the central government as a  
“common person.”8 They launched vociferous personal attacks on the Dalai Lama, 
labeling him a “wolf in monk’s robes.” All branches of the exile Tibetan community 
were lumped together and castigated as the “Dalai clique.”9 Though these Chinese 
arguments are generally viewed with disdain around the globe, few foreign leaders have 
been willing to publicly confront the Chinese stand. Most substantive research to 
challenge the Chinese official position has been limited to private academic work with 
                                            
5 Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Post-Olympics Shakedown in Xinjiang and Tibet,” China Brief, Sept. 2008, pp. 2-4.   
6 “Chinese official urges Dalai Lama to respond with sincerity after recent contact,” Xinhua, Beijing, July 6, 2008. 
7 Ibid.  
8 “China unwilling to broach Tibet with Dalai Lama,” Indo-Asian News Service, Beijing, Tuesday, July 15, 2008.  
9 Michael C. Davis, “For Talks to Succeed China Must Admit to a Tibet Problem,” Yale Global Online, May 16, 2008. 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/talks-succeed-china-must-admit-tibet- problem 
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little official engagement. 
In response to a Chinese request made at the July 2008 Sino-Tibetan meeting, the Dalai 
Lama’s representatives in early November presented a formal Tibetan “Memorandum 
on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” outlining their argument for autonomy 
under the Chinese Constitution. 10  The Tibetan Memorandum sets forth Tibetan 
“aspirations” for genuine autonomy and self-government in eleven policy areas, 
including language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, utilization of 
natural resources, economic development and trade, public health, internal public 
security, population migration and cultural, educational, and religious exchanges with 
other countries. Unfulfilled national ethnic autonomy policies enacted under Article 4 of 
the PRC Constitution already promise autonomy in nearly all of these areas. The 
exception may be those relating to immigration and external exchanges in the 
commercial and cultural areas, which appear instead to track policies similar to those 
applied under the PRC Constitution Article 31 “one country, two systems” formula. 
There appears to be nothing in the law on national minority autonomy that would 
prohibit these extra protections in response to the unique local character, as allowed by 
the national minority law, discussed below. In the interest of self-government, the 
Tibetan Memorandum includes a specification that local laws within the scope of 
autonomy not be subject to central approval as is now required in minority areas under 
the Chinese national minority statute and that the terms of their agreement with the 
Central Government not be subject to the Central Government’s unilateral amendment. 
The Tibetans appear to recognize that too much Central oversight and manipulation has 
lead to the failure of the current autonomy policies. They further proposed to unify into 
one autonomous region the thirteen contiguous Tibetan areas that China has designated 
under its national minority autonomy laws. The Tibetan Memorandum acknowledges 
the continuing application of the Chinese socialist system within Tibet, though one may 
doubt whether that economic system persist in China today. 
Finally, the Tibetan Memorandum acknowledges the authority of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and other organs of the Central Government and would accept 
application of the system of local people’s congresses with locally chosen representatives 
within the Tibetan autonomous area. The Tibetan Memorandum was presented as a 
starting position for further negotiation. These proposals track the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that China supported in the UN 
General Assembly. 
 
                                            
10 Tibetan Memorandum, supra note 3.  
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The Chinese response was quick and harsh. In an early November 2008 Chinese State 
Council press conference, Mr. Zhu Weiqun of the United Front Works Department 
attacked the Tibetan position as essentially camouflage for independence. 11  The 
accompanying State Council Address likened the Tibetan notion of “genuine autonomy” 
to the “high degree of autonomy” allowed Hong Kong. The Tibetans were accused of 
seeking “half-independence,” and “covert independence,” though no explanation is 
given why the same language applied to Hong Kong means only autonomy. The State 
Council Address further accuses the exiled Tibetans of “colluding with such dregs as 
‘democracy activists,’ ‘falunkun (Falungong) elements’ and ‘Eastern Turkistan 
terrorists.’” The Tibetan proposal to gain control over immigration is likened to “ethnic 
cleansing.” The exile government is said to be a “small group of splittists.” The meetings 
were essentially damage control, with some international public relations objectives, 
mostly aimed at persuading the Dalai Lama to “give up his splitting activities.” The State 
Council Address declared, “We never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue” and will 
“never make a concession.” Demonstrating even greater insensitivity to Tibetan 
concerns, in January 2009 the PRC created a new holiday to celebrate the “liberation” of 
Tibet which they have labeled “Serfs Emancipation Day.”12 
After the State Council Address the Dalai Lama’s representative published a note 
responding to these various criticisms and emphasizing that the type of self-governing 
autonomy sought in the Tibetan Memorandum is consistent with both the PRC 
Constitution and the practice of autonomy around the world—that posed no risk to the 
sovereignty of the country.13 They emphasized that there was a difference of opinion on 
history and that this should be no “obstacle to seeking a mutually beneficial common 
future within the PRC.”14 The Tibetan exile movement also convened a large Special  
Meeting of the Tibetans in Diaspora in Dharamsala, India in mid-November, 2008 
where Tibetans expressed doubts about Chinese intentions but resolved to continue 
efforts at achieving genuine autonomy under the Middle-Way approach.15 
Presently, things remain at an impasse, with Chinese efforts to control opposition in 
Tibet and isolate the Dalai Lama continuing. Offering no concessions regarding the 
character of autonomy, the Chinese Government in its 2009 White Paper on Tibet 
claims that autonomy is already provided under existing national minority laws.16 This 
                                            
11 Address at the Press Conference by the State Council Office,” Beijing, Nov. 10, 2008 (hereinafter “State Council 
Address”) (address given by Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the 
CPC Central Committee). The United Front Work Department is responsible for national minority affairs. 
12 “Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation Day,’” Xinhua, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-
01/19/content_7410293.htm 
13 Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, Dharamsala, India, Jam. 2010. 
http://www.tibetpolicy.eu/resource-center/official-documents/321-note-on-the- memorandum-on-genuine-
autonomy-for-the-tibetan-people 
14 Ibid., p. 3. 	  
15 Ibid., p. 2. See also, “China’s Communist Regime Losing Ground,” Agencies, Jan. 16, 2008. 
http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=651926  
16 White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” (hereinafter “2009 White Paper”), Information Office 
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essentially means no autonomy at all. In these discussions the Tibetan side, being the 
least empowered, has made the most concessions, including deference to Chinese 
demands regarding sovereignty. The quid pro quo for this concession is supposed to be 
“genuine autonomy” under a formula they have labeled the “Middle Way” approach.17 
The Tibetan exile leaders clearly appreciate the relative weakness of their bargaining 
position. Their hope is that such autonomy will promote both democracy and human 
rights in Tibet.18 There is urgency to the Tibetan cause both as to ongoing repression 
and to secure their long-term survival. With increasing Chinese immigration into Tibet, 
Tibetans are concerned that the 1.3 billion Chinese may eventually swamp the 5.5 
million Tibetans in the vast mountainous regions of Tibet, leaving them a minority in 
their own land.19 By some estimates this has already happened in the Tibetan cities.20 The 
spate of Tibetan self-immolations in 2011 and 2012 have added urgency to this impasse. 
Historical Claims and Present Practice in Tibet 
While the Dalai Lama has gone to great lengths to avoid a discussion of Sino-Tibetan 
history in his formal discussions with the Chinese Government, history has lurked in the 
background of nearly all Chinese claims. The Dalai Lama takes the view that agreement 
on history is not possible without misrepresentation, as he proclaims a willingness to 
work out an autonomy arrangement in the shadow of the present reality. China, on the  
other hand, has not been shy about reinterpreting history to justify present practice, 
especially when there are doubts about the legitimacy of its position. This has led it to 
advance a claim of ancient title and “liberation” with respect to Tibet that the Dalai 
Lama disputes. At a general level this dispute appears less a battle over the historical 
narrative than its interpretation. There are two parts to this dispute: historical title and 
present practice. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
of the State Council of the PRC, March 2009, Beijing. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-
03/02/content_7527376.htm Interview with Chinese Officials Liu Hongji (and Wang Xiaobin), Tibetology Research 
Center, Beijing, Aug. 25, 2006.  
17 The Dalai Lama began to articulate his “middle way” position in speeches in the 1980s before the US Congress and 
before the European Parliament. Address to Members of the United States Congress: Five Point Peace Plan for1988. 
See The Middle-Way Approach, A Framework for Resolving the Issue of Tibet, Department of Information and 
Public Relations, CTA Dharamsala, 2006. http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=115&rmenuid=11  
18 Interview with HH the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, India, Aug. 9, 2006. 
19 Tabulations on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House, 2003). 
Available at http://www.purpleculture.net/tabulation-on-the-2000- population-census-of-the-peoples-republic-of-
china-3-volumes-p-753/  
20 See June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China,” in Barry 
Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer, eds. Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region (London: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2006), at pp. 129-151, 139; Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet, Answers 
to China’s 100 Questions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) (comments by Andrew M. Fischer), pp. 144-
151. 
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“Tibet  has been an inseparable  part  o f  China s ince  anc ient  t imes .” 21 
Assess ing the Histor i ca l  Sino-Tibetan Relat ionship.  Though Chinese officials are 
fond of repeating the above statement, a closer look reveals a more nuanced story and 
hardly one that would sufficiently justify present-day sovereignty.22 The general disrepute 
of imperial claims would alone call into question present- day sovereignty claims based 
on historical empire. But the factual record of the Tibetan case raises further question, as 
Chinese efforts at imperial conquest met Tibetan resistance for nearly a thousand years. 
This historical record does highlight the special character of the historical Sino-Tibetan 
relationship and may offer a yardstick by which to assess current autonomy obligations. 
Imperial China often faced external threats on its western borders and attempted to 
neutralize these threats by conquering and assimilating its neighbors. Though Tibet was 
sometimes a target of such efforts, its remote mountain location made it less of a threat 
and inhibited Chinese efforts at conquest. After Tibet’s own imperial age during the 
Chinese Tang Dynasty, it rarely posed sufficient threat to justify a costly conquest and 
direct rule.23 Rather, a loose imperial association prevailed. It was only during the last 
Chinese dynasty, the Qing, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that military 
invasion and imperial occupation sometimes occurred. Even then Tibet was treated as a 
vassal state and part of China’s external empire subject to indirect rule.24 Eliot Sperling 
identifies China’s claim that Tibet was always an inseparable part of China as a late 
twentieth century invention.25 
Present-day Chinese accounts usually date China’s claimed incorporation of Tibet to the 
Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1270-1368). The Tibetan abbot Sakya Pandita is reported 
to have subordinated Tibet to the emerging Mongol Empire in 1247AD. With some 
initial Tibetan resistance, the Mongols invaded and establish administrative control in 
1267. It was subsequent to this in 1270 that the Mongol King, Kubilai Khan, proclaimed  
the Yuan Dynasty in China. Even then China was administered separately from Tibet 
among the Mongol’s conquest.26 
Warren Smith describes a carefully calibrated diplomatic relationship from the Yuan 
Dynasty forward between China’s emperors and ruling Tibetan lamas. Imperial attempts 
at subordination would be matched with Tibetan resistance.27 In the Yuan Dynasty, 
leading Tibetan lamas served in a religious advisory role for the Mongol emperors—a 
                                            
21 2009 White Paper, supra note 17.   
22 Eliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington: East West Center, Policies Studies 7, 2004). 
23 See Christopher I. Beckwith, Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 24, 167 (1987). 
24 Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (University of California, 1999) at 
327-336; Sperling, supra, note 24, at 28-30. Both Crossley and Sperling note that these areas fell not under the Qing 
civil government but under the Court of Colonial Affairs (lifan yuan). 
25 Ibid., p. 28 
26 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview, 1996), pp. 83-100. 
27 Ibid. 
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role characterized by the Tibetans as a Cho-yon or patron-priest relationship.28 During the 
succeeding Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) this relationship persisted, though the 
Ming court seemed to value Tibetan lamas more for their intermediary role in dealing 
with the still threatening Mongols. The succeeding Manchu dominated Qing Dynasty 
(1636- 1910) featured the highest level of Chinese intervention and sometimes conquest 
in Tibet, though no serious incorporation of a Tibet that remained separate from China. 
Complex interplay and protocol would offer the emperor’s support for rule in Tibet by 
the Gelugpa Buddhist sect under the Dalai Lama.29 In the eighteenth century, the 
expanding Qing intruded more and more on Tibetan autonomy. By 1720, under the 
Emperor Kang Hsi, the Qing occupied and ruled Tibet, though the Qing garrison was 
withdrawn when he died in 1722. Such occupation was restored later and off and on in 
the decades to follow. During its occupations, to advance its efforts at indirect rule the 
Qing set in place a permanent government under a Tibetan Kashag or council. The Qing 
was also represented in Lhasa by its Amban. Qing control always involved at most 
indirect imperial rule, with central Tibet considered part of the Qing’s “exterior 
empire.”30 
From 1911 until the PRC occupation in 1950, Tibet was de facto independent. To justify 
their invasion and occupation, Chinese officials claim Tibet during this period was 
hopelessly feudal and savage.31 One doubts that feudal Tibet suffered from any worse 
conditions than its Asian neighbors. Commentators contest recent Chinese claims of 
systematic savagery and serfdom.32 Even Melvyn Goldstein, who is often cited in 
Chinese official accounts, notes that Tibetan serfs “were not necessarily downtrodden.”33 
It seemed that Tibet had a traditional land-based economy with hierarchical social  
structures that are not uncommon in such systems.34 At this time, Tibet also began the 
first stages of political modernization. With a council or cabinet called the Kashag in 
place since the late Qing Dynasty, Tibetans had in the 1860s introduced a national 
assembly or Tshongdu, which included representatives of Lhasa’s monasteries and secular 
officials. 35  In recent Tibetan exile a form of liberal constitutional democracy has 
emerged, including universal suffrage in the exile community, a directly elected prime 
minister served by a cabinet or Kashag, a Supreme Justice Commission, and an elected 
Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies.36 The Dalai Lama has recently withdrawn from 
temporal rule in favor of the elected Prime Minister, a situation he promises will persist 
                                            
28 Sperling, supra note 23, pp. 30-31.  
29 Ibid. pp. 111-112. The title “Dalai Lama” was introduced during the Ming Dynasty by a Mongol leader Altan Khan, 
designating Sonam Gyatso, the abbot of the Drepung monastery, the third Dalai Lama. Anne-Marie Blondeau and 
Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 21, pp. 35-36. The word Dalai derives from the Mongolian word 
Tale, for oceans.  
30 Smith, Tibetan Nation, supra note 27, pp. 121, 134-138, 145, 151. 
31 2009 White Paper, supra note 3. 
32 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments of Robert Barnett), supra note 21, 
pp. 81-84. 
33 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951 (University of California Press, 1989), p. 5. 
34 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments of Katia Buffetrille), supra note 
21, at pp. 293-298.  
35 Ibid., pp. 10-31.  
36 Lobsang Sangay, “Tibet: Exiles Journey,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 119- 130. 
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in some agreed form in an autonomous Tibet.37 
The period of de facto independence also witnessed the introduction of the language of 
modern statehood and sovereignty. In negotiations with Tibet and British India, 
Republican Chinese officials generally acknowledged that Tibet had a special status with 
only Chinese indirect rule. In negotiations at Shimla, India in 1913, the British advanced 
a notion, similar to that which China had accepted for Mongolia, of inner and outer 
Tibet. This distinguished a largely independent central Tibet under Chinese suzerainty 
from a subordinate Eastern Tibet under Chinese sovereignty. All parties initialed the 
Shimla Convention, accepting this view, though the Chinese ultimately did not ratify it, 
as they were dissatisfied with the stipulated boundary between inner and outer Tibet.38 In 
various other negotiations in the 1930s, China acknowledged Tibet’s high degree of 
autonomy under nominal Chinese rule. The United States and Britain early on tended to 
characterize Chinese imperial territorial claims as suzerainty.39 
As the Dalai Lama explains it, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet 
in 1951, he faced an offer he could not refuse for Tibet to become part of the PRC. 40 
With weak international support to do other wise, he accepted a Seventeen-Point 
Agreement “on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”41 The Chinese, at the  
time, appeared more concerned with gaining territory and resisting outside imperialism 
than with saving Tibetans from feudal poverty. As the only treaty-like agreement with 
any of its purported national minorities, the 17-point agreement acknowledged the 
special status of Tibet and promised autonomy under Tibet’s indigenous system of self-
rule. Early on China failed to keep these special commitments, pushing Tibet toward 
“democratic reform.” 
Chafing under the thumb of their new cadre rulers in March of 1959 Tibetans rebelled 
and the Dalai Lama fled Tibet.42 This brought to an end centuries of Tibetan self-rule. 
On March 28, 1959, after the Dalai Lama’s departure, China dismissed the local 
government and for the first time in history established direct Chinese rule over all of 
Tibet. The Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR), which 
had been established under the Dalai Lama’s earlier formal chairmanship, was declared 
                                            
37  Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and the Basic Features of the Constitution, Feb. 26, 1992 
http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=101&rmenuid=11 ; The Middle-way Approach, supra note 18. The 2011 
election in the Tibetan diaspora resulted in election of legal academic Lobsang Sangay as the first lay Prime Minister or 
Kalon Tripa. Abhishek Madhukar, “Exiled Tibetans elect political heir to Dalai Lama, Reuters,” April 27, 2011. 
38 Goldstein, supra, note 34, pp. 68-80, 832-841.  
39  “(A) distinctive element of the feudal suzerainty relationship is that the suzerain holds the source of the 
governmental authority of the vassal state whose ruler he grants the right to exercise the authority autonomously,” 
Michael C. van Walt van Praag, The Status of Tibet (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 105-06. See also United States 
Policy Concerning the Legal Status of Tibet, 1942-1956, Historical Division, Department of State, Research Project 
No. 403, November, 1957, US National Archives 793B.oo/11-157. 
40 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama (HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), p. 64; 
Goldstein, supra note 34, pp. 798-803.  759-772.  
41 Seventeen-point Agreement, supra note 4. See Goldstein, supra note 34, p. 759-772. 
42 Dalai Lama, supra note 41, p. 136. 
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the official governing body.43 In September 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
was proclaimed under the first People’s Congress of the TAR. Under the national 
minority laws, Tibet no longer enjoys a special status, being lumped together with fifty-
five designated “national minorities.” 
The PRC’s Pract i ce  o f  Autonomy in Tibet .  China’s national minority autonomy 
policies applied in Tibet and throughout the country are promulgated in the current 1982 
PRC Constitution 44 and in the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) passed in 
1984, and revised in 2001. 45Article 4 of PRC Constitution provides that, “Regional 
autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
concentrated communities.” Under LRNA Article 15 autonomous areas carry out their 
role “under the unified leadership of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it.” 
The LRNA promises national minority autonomy in respect of language, education, 
political representation, administrative appointments, local economic and financial 
policies, and the use of local natural resources. Effective exercise of such promised 
autonomy is in doubt. These laws are narrowly applied and allow substantial intrusion of 
central control and the national political system into local affairs. They contrast sharply 
with the flexible approach under PRC Constitution Article 31, as applied in Hong Kong 
and Macau. 
The 1982 PRC Constitution, passed during China’s liberalizing phase, appears to offer 
enhanced local autonomy. Along with the LRNA, it includes the power, subject to 
higher approval, to enact “regulations on the exercise of autonomy (zizhi tiaoli) and 
other separate regulations (danxing tiaoli) in light of the political, economic and cultural  
characteristics.” 46 “Regulations on the exercise of autonomy” have the status of a sub-
constitution or basic law and it is expected that one such regulation will be enacted in 
each autonomous area. 47 The required higher approval must typically come from the 
next higher level of government, for autonomous regions the Central Government and 
for autonomous prefectures and counties the provincial government. None of the PRC’s 
five autonomous regions: Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia, have 
received approval for such basic regulation on the exercise of autonomy. The one 
attempt at enacting a basic regulation on the exercise of autonomy in the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region (TAR) went through 15 drafts and was eventually abandoned 
without being submitted to the State Council. 48 Various autonomous prefectures and 
counties have received approval from provincial governments for basic autonomy laws 
                                            
43 Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (PCTAR), Established in April 1956. 
44 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 89 and 112-122. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html 
45 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (hereinafter LRNA), 1984, revised 2001. 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/13/content_1207139.html 
46 PRC Constitution (1982), supra note 45, Article 116; LRNA, supra note47, Article 19. Such provision is repeated in 
Article 66 of the Legislative Law.  
47 Ibid., p. 10 
48 Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, “Unused Power: Contestation Over Autonomy Legislation in the PRC,” Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 82/1, 2009, pp. 29-46, at 39-40. 
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that largely track the LRNA content. Autonomous regions and other areas have enacted 
many “separate regulations.”49 A third category would be ordinary laws unrelated to 
autonomy, which do not require such higher approval.50 
Chinese communism and Communist Party (CCP) control offers an even more daunting 
challenge to autonomy. This is especially evident in the legislative drafting process. 
Chunli Xia describes a complex system of CCP oversight of the legislative drafting 
process with numerous approvals required from various CCP party committees at each 
stage of the process.51 Given the center’s control over the CCP and the fact that top 
party officials always come from the center there is little room for local legislative 
initiative.52 The imposition is further bolstered by the party’s Marxist ideology, which 
denigrates Tibetan claims by denying the essential character of China’s policies in Tibet. 
The CCP characterizes the 1950 occupation of Tibet as “liberation” and the institution 
of CCP rule as “democratic reform.” This Marxist logic views colonialism as only a 
product of capitalist exploitation. Since China never reached the stage of full capitalist 
development it could not have colonized Tibet. Instead, China “liberated” the exploited 
classes of Tibet under a Chinese “internal multinational system,” in a “common 
program” of local autonomous rule.53 Autonomy was merely a temporary solution on 
the path to ultimate assimilation. 54  The CCP clearly envisioned that “the local 
Government of Tibet should carry out “reform” voluntarily.”55 Such a system was, in 
fact, imposed after the 1959 uprising when the Dalai Lama fled. 
After the 1959 Tibetan uprising, all forms of traditional political structure were quickly 
eliminated. The indigenous form of government promised in the 1951 Seventeen-point 
Agreement did not survive. The replication of the national political structures in 
minority areas has made them highly susceptible to top-down central administrative 
control. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was an especially severe period of hardline 
class struggle and massive cultural destruction across China. In the early 1980s, after 
Chinese Premier Hu Yaobang observed especially dire conditions in Tibet, a remorseful 
China briefly pursued a policy of liberalization. As Tibetans became more outspoken in 
the slightly more liberal environment this was followed by even greater repression and 
martial law, as hardliners in the Beijing regime concluded that liberalization had 
                                            
49 Separate regulations are made by autonomous legislative bodies on specific topics such as language, marriage, family 
planning, etc.  
50 See Chunli Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People’s Republic of China: 
The Law and the Reality,” in J. Oliveira and P. Cardinal, eds., One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders: Perspectives of 
Evolution (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009), pp. 541-564 (citing Organic Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, Article 7 and the Legislative Law, Article 63). 
51 Ibid.  
52 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments by Thierry Dodin), supra note 21, 
pp. 191-196.  
53 Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (1949). 
54 Warren W. Smith, jr.,   China's Tibet, supra note 2, at 233. Chinese officials cite advanced technology and modern 
communications to justify direct rule. Interview with Liu Hongji, supra note 17. 
55 2009 White Paper, supra note 17, p. 1.  
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encouraged greater resistance. In the recent decade, a policy of cracking down on 
political support for the Dalai Lama has included so-called “patriotic education” and 
greater emphasis on economic development under which Chinese immigration has been 
favored.56 Today only Hong Kong and Macau retain a distinctive form of local self-rule. 
Chinese repression has taken many forms, including military occupation and 
crackdowns, the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries, suppression of religion, 
coerced “reeducation” of monks and nuns, imprisonment of dissidents, and the forced 
relocation of rural dwellers and herders to more populated areas. Monks and nuns have 
especially resisted coercion to renounce the Dalai Lama.57 Popular dissent and rebellion 
famously arose in 1959, 1989 and 2008. Increased tensions in Tibet, most recently 
evident in a rash of more than thirty self- immolations over the past two years, bear out 
the continued Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies.58 
Both the Chinese government and its critics have issued reports on Chinese policies in 
Tibet. The March 2009 Chinese White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in 
Tibet” highlights favorable statistics on Tibetan participation in autonomous 
governance, including: Tibetans and other minorities holding 94 percent of the seats in 
local people’s congresses; a 96.4 percent voter turnout rate for participation in the 
electoral process; Tibetan and other ethnic minority deputies holding 77 percent of the  
staff positions in state organs at the regional, prefectural and county levels; and a claim 
of Tibetan occupation of the top positions of various autonomous governments and 
standing committees.59 At the time of the report 12 of the 20 deputies from the TAR to 
the National People’s Congress were Tibetan. The report states that the Tibetan 
language is taught in the schools, and widely used along with the Chinese language—
though critics worry this is mostly at the primary level.60 
Even that has come under threat, with recent reports of Tibetan demonstrations against 
reported Chinese efforts in Qinghai autonomous areas to replace Tibetan with Chinese 
as the primary language of instruction in primary schools. 61The Chinese report also 
emphasizes China’s contribution to Tibet’s economic development, though critics worry 
that these policies benefit Chinese more than Tibetans. 62  The bulk of the report 
                                            
56 Warren W. Smith, Jr., “China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy,” East-West Center Washington Working Papers, No. 
2, October 2004.  
57 Interview with President, Gu Chu Sun Movement of Tibet (Association of former Political Prisoners), Dharamsala, 
Aug. 3, 2006; Interview of “Singing Nun” Renchen Choeky, Dharamsala, Aug. 4, 2006 (Sentenced to prison for 
demonstrating in protest in Lhasa; and sentenced again while in prison when 18 nuns produced a singing recording 
that was smuggled out)  
58 “Teen sets himself on fire ‘for Tibet,’” South China Morning Post, Oct. 17, 2011, p. A7; Ng Tze- wei, “Tibetan Nun 
Burns to Death,” South China Morning Post, Oct. 19, 2011, p. A6.  
59 2009 White Paper, supra note 17. 
60 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments by Amy Heller and Anne-Marie 
Blondeau), supra note 21, p. 235.  
61 Edward Wong, “Tibetans in China Protest Proposed Curbs on Their Language,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2010. 
62 Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds., Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 21 (comments by Andrew M. 
Fischer), pp. 250-277. Fischer worries that the current subsidies tends to benefit Chinese officials and large Chinese 
construction companies, while creating dependency—what he calls the boomerang effect. Ibid., p. 269. Fischer sees 
greater productivity if Tibetans are left to traditional herding and farming. Ibid., p. 275. 
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emphasizes China’s “liberation” of Tibet and its “democratic reform.” Though the 
liberation was stated to be from “foreign imperial forces,” the text of the report lays 
greater empirical emphasis on liberation from Tibetans themselves, accusing the 
traditional Tibetan elites of horrific feudal practices. No attempt is made to explain why 
China should assume the role of modernizing Tibet. The claimed democratic reform is 
not much explained, overlooking China’s own lack of democratic reform. 
A 1997 report of the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) notes that while “Tibetans 
are in positions of nominal authority, they are often shadowed by more powerful 
Chinese officials” and that “every local organ is shadowed by a CCP committee or 
‘leading group.’”63 A 2007 report by Minority Rights Group International and Human 
Rights in China highlights several deficiencies, including the centralization of power in 
the top leadership of the CCP; the above concerns with the law-making process, Chinese 
dominance of CCP leadership in minority areas, including Chinese officials from the 
center always holding the top CCP post, and the lack of real power at the local level.64 
Of particular concern for the deeply religious Tibetan nationality, is a CCP rule that bars 
party members from practicing Tibetan Buddhism and a recently added rule that cadres 
withdraw their children from Tibetan schools in India.65 Particularly puzzling has been 
the formal claim by the avowedly atheist Chinese government to choose the next 
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other leading lamas, which recently moved the 
Dalai Lama to issue his own formal statement making clear his own plans for 
reincarnation or emanation challenging any Chinese official role in this.66 
International Legal Standards 
Self-determination of peoples is grounded in the UN Charter and in the international 
human rights covenants, though these sources offer little guidance on who are the 
peoples entitled to such right. International law generally distinguishes between external 
and internal rights of self-determination.67 When the external right, which is thought to 
include a right of secession, is effectively denied, justified or not, then the internal right 
                                            
63 Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1997), pp. 14–21.  
64 Human Rights in China and Minority Rights Group International, China: Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 
(Minority Rights Group International, 2007). Available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.Report.pdf . 
65 Kristine Kwok, “Officials to be sacked for sending their children to ‘Dalai Lama Schools,’” South China Morning Post, 
July 18, 2006.  
66 Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation, Sept. 24, 
2011. http://dalailama.com/messages/tibet/reincarnation-statement For the Beijing response, see Zhuang Pinghui, 
“We choose next Dalai Lama says Beijing,” South China Morning Post, 27 Sept.2011. 
67 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 UNGA Resolution 1514 
(XV), 15 UN Gaor, Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/4684 (1960), p. 66; Declarations on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 1970 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 UN 
Gaor, Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/5217 (1970), at 121. The Human Rights Covenants in their first article guarantee 
“all peoples” the right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
rights.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. As a party to the ICESCR China is 
bound by this. 
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may be all that survives.68 This typically involves some notion of autonomy, though 
autonomy has not enjoyed very strong protection in international law.69 It may be 
argued, however, that in two circumstances autonomy becomes effectively 
internationalized: 1) when it is the consequence of treaty arrangements or 2) when it 
arises out of the denial of rights of self-determination, especially of indigenous peoples. 
The Tibet case includes both. The Seventeen-point Agreement reflects a treaty 
arrangement and Tibetans appear to be indigenous people or at least similarly situated. 
For indigenous populations, human rights, self-determination and autonomy acquired 
greater international traction in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.70 The Declaration provides the substantive content of internal autonomy. While 
UN declarations are generally not binding as such, the nearly unanimous passage (143 to 
4 with eleven abstentions) of the Indigenous People’s Declaration along with its 
purported declaration of existing customary law may strengthen its binding effect.71 The 
Chinese government voted for the declaration but claims there are no indigenous  
peoples in China,72 claiming 5,000 years of national unity and harmony with minorities 
living on their own lands.73 
While the UN Declaration does not define “indigenous peoples,” it does specify that 
they exist throughout the world. 74 A separate 1986 UN study “China Concerned with 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” defined indigenous peoples as “communities, 
[...] which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing[...].” 75  It also emphasized that such communities consider 
themselves distinct from the dominant sector. The Tibetan people, even in China’s own 
accounts in the 2009 White Paper, clearly satisfy these criteria of distinctiveness as to 
language, culture and history. Whatever its legal status, this UN Declaration can clearly 
serve as a useful guide to measure Chinese policies discussed above. 
The UN Declaration’s preliminary articles emphasize demilitarization of indigenous 
lands; the right of indigenous people to freely determine their relationship with states; 
that treaties, agreements and constructive arrangements with states are matters of 
                                            
68 Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) p. 385, Supreme Court of Canada.  
69 D. Sanders, “Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law,” 55 Nordic Journal of International Law 17 (1986); F. L. 
Kirgis, “The Degrees of Self-determination in the UN Era,” 88 American Journal of International Law 310 (1994); Hans-
Joachim Heintze, “Evolution of Autonomy and Federalism,” in Oliveira and Cardinal, supra, note 51, pp. 389-408. 
70 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (hereinafter “Indigenous People’s Declaration)  
http://www .tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/ipr/undrip/OfficialResolution/A61L.67%20eng.pdf.  
71 Ibid. Opposing the Declaration were the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  
72 “China Concerned with Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
Switzerland, 1997/04/01, http://ch.China- embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm 
73 Speech of Chinese Representative Group Deputy Tong Zhihwa, Human Rights Council, 1st Meeting, 11th Drafting 
Session. http://www.docip.org/HumanRightsCouncil/sessions1/cddh1_5.pdf .  
74 There are thought to be over 370 million indigenous people worldwide. “UN adopts declaration on rights for 
indigenous peoples worldwide,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 13, 2007. 
75 United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Jose Martinez Coho, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/21/Add.8. (hereinafter “UN Working Group Report”) 
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international concern; “the fundamental importance of the right of self-determination of 
all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development;” and that the right to exercise 
self-determination in conformity with international law shall not be denied. 
The operative articles of the Declaration guarantee indigenous peoples: the right of self-
determination; 76the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs; 77 the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their 
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies, including access in privacy to 
their religious and cultural sites and control of their ceremonial objects; 78 the right to 
participate in decision making in matters which would affect their rights, through 
representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures;79 the 
right to be consulted and prior consent through their own representative institutions 
before implementing state legislative and administrative measures;80 and the right to 
recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements. At the same time they are guaranteed the rights protected by the various 
human rights treaties and covenants. China’s imposition of top-down CCP control 
under its national political system and its weak protection of basic human rights clearly 
falls greatly short of these standards of indigenous self-rule. 
A Recommended Path Forward 
The spirit of self-determination articulated above, in conjunction with Tibet’s centuries-
long tradition of self-rule and autonomy, clearly calls for substantive change in China’s 
Tibet policy. That same spirit suggests that the Tibetan indigenous leadership be 
consulted over the policy direction. The Tibetan Memorandum offers initial guidance. 
The good news is that the Chinese Constitution already offers the tools in various 
articles on autonomy for a flexible approach to the Tibet question. A flexible approach 
that fully implements China’s national minority laws, supplemented where appropriate 
with guarantees already applied under the “one country, two systems” formula, can 
surely be judged acceptable within China’s constitutional framework. 
Foreign ministries concerned with this issue should encourage precisely this approach 
using the Tibetan Memorandum as a point of takeoff. While China has traditionally 
objected to foreign interference, it clearly places great stock in foreign approval of its 
newly claimed status as a responsible leading state. Recognition of China’s status surely 
warrants a reciprocal right to comment on what should be expected of a leading country 
in respect to basic human rights. China’s leading trading partners, such as the United 
                                            
76 Indigenous People’s Declaration, supra note 71, Article 3.  
77 Ibid., Article 4. 
78 Ibid., Article 12. 
79 Ibid., Article 18. 
80 Ibid., Article 19. 
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States and Europe should use their good offices to emphasize this connection. 
While the PRC Government has long taken a strident view that is hyper- concerned that 
relaxing its Tibet polices will threaten national security, this view seems unfounded. A 
confident and secure Tibetan community within China would surely offer China greater 
security than a distraught and downtrodden community effectively under military 
occupation. In the Dalai Lama, the Chinese Government faces a reasonable and 
influential interlocutor who may assist them greatly to address their security concerns 
with a workable model that would, on his agreement, be accepted by both the Tibetan 
and international communities. This would be especially true with a model based on the 
standards articulated in the UN Declaration, for which the Tibetan Memorandum is a 
reasonably close fit. At the same time a workable model in Tibet would offer a very 
useful model for addressing the Xinjiang and other peripheral problems, each with 
attention to the unique local character in an asymmetric association. 
In some respects, China’s own political reforms nationwide appear to be held hostage to 
its concerns about losing control over its peripheral areas. A strong repressive center is 
seemingly thought necessary to hold the country together. Given peripheral tensions and 
little success at achieving the internal political reform conducive to China’s continuing 
development a change of approach seems warranted. As the Hong Kong model is 
sometimes advanced as a possible solution to the Taiwan problem, an agreeable Tibet 
model could be offered as a solution in Xinjiang and possibly Inner Mongolia. In 
addition to freeing up the path to domestic reform, these arrangements may likewise 
eliminate some of China’s stickiest foreign policy challenges. The Hong Kong model was 
the product of a confident and inventive Chinese leadership. That inventiveness is again 
sorely needed. At present Tibet and Taiwan are problems at the heart of nearly every 
foreign policy outing. More magnanimous gestures by China to address these problems 
may open the door to China normalizing its international relations and achieving more 
solid international standing. While the offer of genuine autonomy in a gentler China may 
prove an attractive option to China’s disputed peripheral communities, it would also go a 
long way toward easing concerns about China’s rise in the world at large. 
 
 
 
 
 
